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INTRODUCTION
Rather than relying solely on the formal interpretations of government regulators invited by the structure of local zoning ordinances, the
City of Seattle should adopt a process that invites community-based me
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diation and problem-solving when a significant shift in housing density is
contemplated in a developer’s proposal. Greater resident participation in
development projects allows the City of Seattle to better support those
residents in their reliance interests arising from zoning ordinances while
simultaneously furthering the policies that underpin urban zoning. This is
especially true when such development projects raise the possibility of
substantial impacts on the character of a community or its commons.
Moreover, such alternative dispute resolution processes may also help to
mitigate potential detriments to the community commons or provide a
mechanism for an equitable exchange of capital between developers and
residents to offset negative impacts to property values.
This Note specifically examines the development of urban residential property into micro-housing apartment buildings in the City of Seattle, the possible consequences, and a potential community-based solution
for disputes regarding such development. Part I introduces the issue using anecdotal and quantitative information, including snapshots of some
of the conflicts between urban homeowners and developers and the
sometimes questionable application of local zoning ordinances to favor
development in the context of micro-housing in Seattle. Included in this
discussion is a summary of the “smart growth” principles that supported
the development and the countervailing interests of incumbent residents.
Part II examines Washington State’s Growth Management Act and suggests how it may have impacted the quick acceptance of micro-housing
development in Seattle. Part III explores incumbent residents’ reliance
interests in zoning ordinances for protection against externalities and
maintenance of consumer surplus in their homes. Part IV reviews the
potential harms suffered by residents adjacent to dramatic residential development and the legal remedies available at law. Finally, I offer a
community-based solution to allow for the redress of such harms.
I. THE BACKSTORY
With housing prices soaring in attractive urban neighborhoods and
demand for cost-conscious rental options increasing, developers in a variety of jurisdictions have shown interest in micro-housing development.
Cities including New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle have either allowed or actively promoted micro-unit housing development within their borders.1 Supporters champion micro-units as a way of providing
affordable housing, reducing sprawling development through urban infill, mitigating the energy usage and environmental impact of larger de1. Claire Thompson, Peace in a Pod: How Tiny Apartments Could Reshape the Big City,
GRIST (Dec. 13, 2012), http://grist.org/cities/apodment-livin.
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velopments, and allowing seniors to age in place.2 City planners, business leaders, and local officials have embraced micro-units as a means
through which expensive cities can attract and retain young professionals.3 However, given the burgeoning attempts to permit and encourage
these housing types on a larger scale, no comprehensive analyses of their
actual effects have been completed.
A. The Loophole: An Early Path to Micro-Housing
Development in Seattle
Seattle has seen the most significant development of micro-housing
units, and many of those developments have sparked controversy in the
city.4 As of July 2014, Seattle had permitted over 3,600 micro-housing
units, with many residences already occupied and several projects underway in varied stages of development.5 Until 2013, shrewd developers
exploited what many long-term neighborhood residents described as a
“loophole” in city regulations.6 Housing in Seattle with nine or more individuals in a unit was traditionally classified as “congregate housing”
and was subject to a public review process.7 To stay under this number,
developers built buildings with “suites” containing eight separatelyleased apartments for single individuals; the apartments had a private
bathroom and kitchenette but shared one full kitchen.8 Because each
“suite” was considered one “unit,” developers were able to avoid design
and environmental reviews by building seven or fewer “suites” in each
building on their property.9 In Seattle’s low-rise districts, where many of
these buildings have been developed, mandatory review was triggered
only if more than eight dwelling units were developed.10
2. Dominic Holden, Thinking Small: A Loophole for Really Affordable Housing, THE
STRANGER (June 4, 2009), https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/thinking-small/Content?oid=
1635067.
3. Thompson, supra note 1.
4. See Maria Dolan, Are Apodments Ruining Seattle Neighborhoods?, SEATTLE MAG.,
Nov. 2012, at 106–11, available at http://www.seattlemag.com/article/are-apodments-ruiningseattle-neighborhoods (discussing the controversy surrounding developments of Seattle “aPodments”).
5. Dominic Holden, The Fight Against Small Apartments, THE STRANGER (May 8, 2013),
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/the-fight-against-small-apartments/Content?oid=16701155.
6. Id.
7. See Holden, supra note 2 (discussing code regulations governing congregate housing).
8. Lynn Thompson, Critics of Micro-Apartments Calling for a Moratorium, SEATTLE TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/critics-of-micro-apartmentscalling-for-a-moratorium.
9. Id.
10. See CITY OF SEATTLE DEP’T OF CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, TIP 238, DESIGN REVIEW:
GENERAL INFORMATION, APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS, AND SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2011),
available at http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/Publications/CAM/cam238.pdf; CITY OF SEATTLE DEP’T
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As such, developers were able to build apartment complexes with,
ostensibly, up to fifty-six rentable units without submitting to any of the
normal public comment processes or environmental impact reviews that
the building of a traditional nine-unit apartment building in that same
neighborhood would trigger. At the same time, developers counted the
units differently for different purposes: they used each separate sleeping
area as a unit when applying for tax exemptions, but combined seven of
these spaces together when applying for building permits.11 Though Seattle’s Office of Housing announced in March 2013 that it would no longer
allow developers to use different unit counts to serve different purposes,
many projects were approved before this change and thus were able to
take advantage of this previously uncontemplated loophole.12
B. The Neighbors Complained and Development Increased
As early as 2009, neighbors of these micro-unit development projects lodged complaints with Seattle including: the insufficiency of
on-street parking in the area for the increased utilization from dozens of
new neighbors, overcrowding of the residential neighborhood, and adverse changes to the neighborhood’s character and aesthetics.13 Some
also stated concerns for micro-housing residents, such as the lack of
proper egress from top floors to ensure safety during a fire.14 Even
though some have championed these micro-housing developments as a
form of “smart growth,” many long-time residents argued that they constituted an “upzon[ing] without any process” and failed a long-term
planning goal of adequately spreading increased density citywide.15
Many neighbors of such projects asked the city to enact a moratorium on
micro-housing development until some of their concerns could be better
addressed by a modernized building code.16 Yet, officials at the Seattle
Department of Construction and Inspections (SDCI) permitted a significant number of micro-housing developments throughout 2009, and over
the next several years SDCI (formerly known as the Department of Planning and Development) created training protocols for its planners to recognize and permit micro-housing under townhouse and congregate hous-

CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, TIP 208, WHEN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW IS REQUIRED IN SEATTLE 1
(2012), available at http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/Publications/CAM/cam208.pdf.
11. Thompson, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Dolan, supra note 4.
16. Id.

OF
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ing definitions.17 Subsequent to this change, there was a rapid increase in
congregate projects. Approximately 1,100 units were permitted using the
congregate designation, with a number of projects housing well over 100
people;18 the largest was slated to contain 235 people in individual
units.19
One early development in the Capitol Hill neighborhood, built under the aPodments brand, described its project as “town houses” under
the land use code but as a “boarding house” under the building code.20
This sleight-of-hand maneuver allowed the developer to construct the
buildings without participating in any design review procedures or
providing the type of notice to its neighbors that would otherwise have
been required for the construction of a multifamily housing development
of its size in that neighborhood.21 Many of these apartments were only
approximately 150 square feet in size and, like many such micro-housing
units, lacked sinks in the bathrooms to avoid being labeled “dwelling
units.”22 In addition, tiny in-unit kitchenettes were overlooked by planners at SDCI using an “unwritten interpretation” suggesting that the
building code’s “cooking appliance” specification for kitchens required
the presence of a full stove in order to qualify as a true “dwelling unit.”23
C. Residents’ Countervailing Interests
Some community residents argue that such infill projects result in
adverse effects on surrounding neighborhoods. These costs may include
such negative externalities as increased traffic congestion or lost open
space associated with infill.24 Many of these local concerns relate to a
fear that an increase in population translates to a greater demand for local
services that will be either paid for directly through increased taxes or
indirectly by decreased service quality due to overcrowding.25 This concern is most salient for development that occurs at significantly higher
densities in neighborhoods that have historically housed only single fam-

17. Micro-Housing Provokes Big Debate, SEATTLE NEIGHBORHOOD COAL. (July 1, 2014),
http://seattleneighborhoodcoalition.wordpress.com/micro-housing-provokes-big-debate/.
18. Sara Solovitch, Scrunched in Seattle, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/seattle-micro-housing-boom-111874.
19. Id.
20. SEATTLE NEIGHBORHOOD COAL., supra note 17.
21. See Thompson, supra note 8.
22. Holden, supra note 5.
23. Solovitch, supra note 18.
24. Stephen Malpezzi, Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas, 7 J. HOUSING RES., 209, 210–11 (1996).
25. Id.
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ily homes.26 Moreover, some property buyers associate increased density
with inner city blight, poor service quality, and other problems.27 Troubling to incumbent residents, these perceived negative externalities could
result in lower housing prices in the area.28
D. Other Cities Moved with Caution
While other municipalities also faced issues with micro-housing
since around 2009, many responded in a significantly different way than
Seattle. For example, San Francisco crafted responsive legislation to allow 220-square-foot apartments in a 375-unit trial rather than exploiting
loopholes in the current code to allow the construction of such projects.29
New York City held a design competition and allowed 250-square-foot
apartments as the minimum unit size.30 Rather than allowing for unfettered development of this new housing style, these cities took a more
conservative approach to better determine what design requirements
should be mandatory for minimum-space dwelling units and engaged in
controlled experimentation with this type of apartment building.
E. The Role of “Smart Growth”
“Smart growth” advocates have applauded Seattle’s quick acceptance of small-footprint living arrangements such as micro-housing.31
These advocates seek to change current patterns of low-density dispersed
development.32 They stress the need for planned growth that concentrates
development in and near current communities because such projects take
advantage of existing infrastructure and increase investment in current
neighborhoods.33 Smart growth advocates also emphasize that planned
growth reduces the conversion of open space areas with public benefits,
decreases traffic volumes, and prevents other such external costs associ26. Anthony Flint, The Density Dilemma: Appeal and Obstacles for Compact and TransitOriented Development (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy Working Paper, 2005), available at
https://drcog.org/documents/Density_dilemma.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Nathan Hurst, Take That, Tokyo! San Francisco Approves 220-Square-Foot ‘MicroApartments,’ WIRED (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/san-franciscomicro-apartments/all/.
30. Lidija Grozdanic, Bloomberg Announces Winner of the adAPT NYC Competition to Develop Micro-Unit Dwellings, INHABITAT (Jan. 31, 2013), http://inhabitat.com/nyc/bloombergannounces-winners-of-the-adapt-nyc-competition-to-develop-micro-unit-dwellings/.
31. Dolan, supra note 4.
32. See Anthony Downs, What Does Smart Growth Really Mean?, 67 PLANNING 20, 20–25
(2001).
33. See Anthony Downs, Smart Growth: Why We Discuss It More Than We Do It, 71 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 367, 367–78 (2005).
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ated with sprawl.34 The smart growth philosophy holds that low-density
subdivisions scattered at the exurban fringe exacerbate traffic congestion
because of longer commutes and increase land consumption due to more
people living on large individual lots in previously undeveloped areas.35
The argument is that only better-planned, higher-density developments
located in and around existing communities can effectively address these
problems.36 Many of these perceived benefits, like decreased congestion
and air pollution, are regional in impact.37
The City of Seattle has also been spurred on in its development
considerations by Washington State’s Growth Management Act, which
looks to increase urban infill as a protective measure against sprawling
development and the diminishment of farm and conservation lands.
II. WASHINGTON’S GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT
From a statutory perspective, the Growth Management Act (GMA)
controls much of the land use regulation in Washington State.38 The
GMA “requires state and local governments to manage Washington’s
growth by identifying and protecting critical areas and natural resource
lands, designating urban growth areas, preparing comprehensive plans
and implementing them through capital investments and development
regulations.”39 The GMA provides thirteen goals to guide cities and
counties in this course of action, which include the consideration of
transportation, housing, economic development, natural resource industries, property rights, and the environment.40
While the GMA establishes state goals, sets deadlines for compliance, and offers direction for municipalities to prepare comprehensive
plans and regulations, it relies primarily on local control instead of any
sort of centralized planning at the state level.41 Within the framework
provided by the mandates of the GMA, local governments have many
34. Robert W. Burchell, David Listokin & Catherine C. Galley, Smart Growth: More Than a
Ghost of Urban Policy Past, Less Than a Bold New Horizon, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 821, 829
(2000).
35. See Mary H. Cooper, Can Managed Growth Reduce Sprawl?, 14 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER
469 (2004).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70A (1990). The GMA has been recognized as “one of the most
comprehensive and modern planning statutes in the country” by the American Planning Association.
AM. PLANNING ASS’N, PLANNING FOR SMART GROWTH: 2002 STATE OF THE STATES 130 (2002).
39. Growth Management Laws and Rules, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Services/localgovernment/GrowthManagement/Pages/LawsRules.aspx (last
visited Mar. 5, 2016).
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2002).
41. Growth Management Laws, supra note 39.

1038

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 39:1031

choices regarding the specific content of comprehensive plans and implementing development regulations. The Washington State Department
of Community, Trade and Economic Development (CTED) does not
have the authority to certify, approve, or reject plans. The only significant check on the land use regulations of local municipalities comes by
way of the Growth Management Hearings Board, which hears and determines allegations that a government agency has not complied with the
GMA.42
The State of Washington originally wrote its GMA in 1990 with the
goal of allowing communities to participate in the land use planning process and tailor the process to their unique needs.43 In practice, however,
the planning process has continued to be top-down.44 Rural communities
with declining populations have tended to adopt the same growth management strategies as cities, such as Seattle, that are experiencing rapid
growth.45 Moreover, “[r]esidents also have complained that the [local
growth management] boards largely have ignored some of the GMA’s
goals, such as recognizing the need to support ‘natural resource industries’ like farming,” while favoring environmental concerns.46 As such,
even though the GMA was originally intended to help facilitate community participation in land use decisions, it has ostensibly created a policy
(and potentially bureaucratic) hurdle for neighbors of proposed urban
infill projects, such as micro-housing development.47
While the GMA has exerted pressure on the green-lighting of micro-housing development by Seattle regulators, better local zoning practices could have pushed back against the top-down mandates to better
mitigate conflicts between incumbent residents and developers at the
municipal and neighborhood levels.
III. ZONING
In the most ideal sense, zoning provides a deliberative process
through which residents of a municipality can express their preferences
42. The board’s administrative rules of practice and procedure can be found in the Washington
Administrative Code. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE tit. 242-03 (2011).
43. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.010 (1990) (“It is in the public interest that citizens,
communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one another in
comprehensive land use planning.”); id. § 36.70A.020(11) (expressing an intention to “[e]ncourage
the involvement of citizens in the planning process”).
44. Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1559 (2007).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See MIKE PODOWSKI & GEOFFREY WENTLANDT, SEATTLE DEP’T OF PLANNING & DEV.,
MICRO-HOUSING
UNITS
AND
CONGREGATE
RESIDENCES
(2014),
available
at
http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/cs/groups/pan/@pan/documents/web_informational/s048065.pdf.
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about the growth and character of their community.48 The prevalence of
zoning laws suggests that residents may have both financial and nonfinancial interests in the planning and coordination of their communities.49
Zoning regulations can be seen to preserve “collective values” and to
protect “a neighborhood from encroachments by land uses inconsistent
with its character.”50 Courts have also given credence to the view of land
use planning as a deliberative tool to preserve the overall character of a
neighborhood.51 For example, courts have upheld procedural measures
that give all community members “a voice in decisions that will affect
the future development of their own community”52 as well as government actions that “preserve the . . . nature of a community and . . . maintain its aesthetic and functional characteristics through zoning requirements.”53
In Washington State, municipal zoning powers trace their origin to
the state constitution. Under the police power provisions of the Washington State Constitution, “[a]ny county, city, town or township may make
and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”54 Yet, Washington
courts have generally followed “Dillon’s Rule” limiting the authority of
municipal corporations to that granted by the legislature: “[A] municipal
corporation’s powers are limited to those conferred in express terms or
those necessarily implied. If there is any doubt about a claimed grant of
power it must be denied. The test for necessary or implied municipal
powers is legal necessity rather than practical necessity.”55
While preserving the nature of a community is an important practical interest, municipal zoning laws are carefully drafted to meet the “legal necessity” standard of Dillon’s Rule. At the same time, judicial scrutiny over zoning ordinances is guided by another crucial variable: the
interests of the incumbent landowner.
48. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 890–91 (1983); Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—
The Functions of Zoning, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 45, 46 & n.6 (1994) (discussing the universality of zoning laws).
50. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted).
51. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 340–
41 (2002) (discussing the importance of “protecting the decisional process” for a regional plan and
finding that a rule penalizing long deliberations would “disadvantage those landowners and interest
groups who are not as organized or familiar with the planning process”).
52. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971).
53. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 821 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995).
54. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
55. Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329, 339 (1983) (internal citations
omitted); see also Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 813–16 (2015).
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A. Zoning and the Interests of the Incumbent Landowner
The enforcement of local zoning ordinances is an essential ingredient in securing community members’ reliance interests in their homes.
Residents of all income groups become attached not only to their personal home or living space but also to the traits of their surrounding neighborhood.56 Whether homeowners or renters, residents “selfishly” care
about things such as the appearance of their street or the neighborhood
park where their children play throughout the summer.57 Public zoning
proceedings allow residents to express their desires for the preservation
of the characteristics that they most strongly value and to develop a degree of consensus around core community issues.58 Preventive land use
regulation is important in determining the compatibility of land uses
within a neighborhood—a significant component of community character. At the parcel-by-parcel level, studies have found zoning laws to be
positively correlated with property values because they prevent the diminution in value from mixed and incompatible land uses.59
In fact, communal attitudes toward zoning expectations have even
begun to impact judicial review of zoning ordinances. American courts
have historically given significant weight to the interests of individual
property owners in their determinations regarding land use.60 More recently, though, concern for the general community welfare has begun
taking precedence, thus favoring most exclusionary zoning measures.61
Communities have been granted a degree of freedom to enact policies in
accordance with community welfare goals even in many cases where
such policies infringe upon a specific individual’s property rights.62
Courts have also begun to shift their jurisprudence to reflect a belief that
municipal regulatory power emanates from its role as an agent for local

56. See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 362 (1986)
(discussing residents’ interest in remaining in an “established” home).
57. Id.
58. Ariel Graff, Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment,
and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 485, 519 (2005) (arguing that developing a comprehensive zoning plan “forces residents to mediate between conflicting values and arrive at a consensus that accurately captures local
sentiments”).
59. See, e.g., Stephen Malpezzi et al., New Place-to-Place Housing Price Indexes for U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, and Their Determinants, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 235, 263 (1998) (finding that
regulations drove up “quality adjusted” rents and housing prices).
60. See Paul E. King, Exclusionary Zoning and Open Housing: A Brief Judicial History, 68
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 459, 460 (1978).
61. JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 97 (2005).
62. Id.
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residents and families rather than for the government.63 Many of these
rulings have focused on the rights and interests of residents in suburban
areas where homeowners tend to comprise a significant component of the
local power base.64
Despite favorable court rulings for suburban residents, developers
in more urban environments tend to exert disproportionate influence in
the land use process because their interests are highly concentrated, eliminating the organizational problems that face neighbors who might oppose development.65 As such, urban residents’ reliance upon zoning protections may be positively correlated with local community members’
ability to more regularly and more actively participate in neighborhood
land use determinations.
B. Protection Against Externalities
Zoning advocates have historically suggested that zoning is necessary to protect or enhance property values,66 particularly the values of
residential properties.67 In this way, zoning serves principally to protect
property owners from the negative externalities of new developments.
Without zoning, residential property owners would face plummeting
property values if a development with significant negative externalities—
a tannery or a metal grinding shop, for example—moved in next door.
Moreover, the mere prospect that such a development could move in
would tend to depress the value of residential property. The solution that
zoning provides is to divide the municipality into zones so that industries
are sited near other industries, commercial enterprises near other commercial enterprises, and residential properties with other residential
properties.
In a more salient example, Keith Wiley conducted a study in 2009
examining the change in property values near residential infill sites in
Montgomery County, Maryland.68 Wiley’s results across the various
models identified a consistent, negative price effect associated with the
infill.69 The study found that, in general, the property values of lower63. ROY LUBOVE, THE URBAN COMMUNITY: HOUSING AND PLANNING IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 95–98 (1967) (arguing for enactment of zoning ordinance principally as a means to protect
existing property values).
64. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1243, 1272–73 (1997).
65. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289
(1992).
66. LUBOVE, supra note 63.
67. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 115 (1966).
68. See KEITH WILEY, AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPACT OF INFILL ON NEIGHBORHOOD
PROPERTY VALUES (2009).
69. Id. at 23.
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income areas tend to benefit whereas higher income areas had property
values decline as a result of infill.70 Also, larger projects generated greater negative effects than smaller projects.71
Some zoning advocates have suggested the prevention of “fiscal
freeloading” as another benefit of zoning.72 According to this view, some
new developments place a greater burden on public services than they
contribute in new taxes.73 Zoning is a means by which such developments can be screened out in favor of developments that pay their fair
share.74 Typically, it is lower-income, multifamily rental housing developments that are thought not to “pay their own way.”75 High-density,
lower-cost developments often increase the demand for public services
by the sheer increase in numbers of new residents they bring to the
community.76
C. Consumer Surplus
Zoning provides additional benefits beyond simply protecting individual property owners against the effects of “spillovers” or negative
externalities that adversely affect the market values of their property.77 It
also protects a homeowner’s consumer surplus in a home and in the surrounding neighborhood—value that lies above the market value of that
home. Zoning in urban neighborhoods is not merely a system for protecting the market values of individual properties, but rather it is a device to
protect neighborhood residents’ interests in their entirety, including consumer surplus in their homes, as well as their interests in the neighborhood commons.78
Neighborhoods are not just made up of individual parcels, but include collective resources comprising a neighborhood commons,79 and
the property rights of an urban neighborhood dweller typically consist
70. Id. at 48.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 206–07 (1975) (arguing that, in a metro area with a large number of
competing municipal jurisdictions, the use of zoning as a neutral fiscal device can make residential
property taxes function as an efficient price for public services).
73. Id. at 206.
74. See Michelle J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metro Areas, in FISCAL ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS 31–33 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975).
75. See Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795,
812–14 (1991).
76. Id. at 814.
77. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION 7–10 (1977).
78. Id. at 10.
79. See Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 311 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
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both in specified rights in an individual dwelling and inchoate rights in a
neighborhood commons. This commons consists of open access, communally owned property, such as streets, sidewalks, parks, playgrounds,
and libraries.80 It also includes restricted access, communally owned
property, such as public schools, public recreational facilities, and public
transportation facilities.81 It further includes privately-owned “quasicommons” to which the public is generally granted access, but with privately imposed restrictions as to use, cost, and duration; examples include restaurants, nightspots, theaters, groceries, and retail establishments.82 Finally, the neighborhood commons includes other intangible
qualities, such as neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics, the physical environment, and relative degrees of anonymity or neighborliness.83 These
features together make up the “character” of a neighborhood. They are
what give the neighborhood its distinctive flavor. An owner or renter of
residential property in an urban neighborhood buys not only a particular
parcel of real estate, but also a share in the neighborhood commons. Typically, differences in the neighborhood commons may be as crucial to a
decision to purchase as differences in individual parcels.84
For many people, a high level of consumer surplus may attach to
particular features of a neighborhood commons. These values are highly
subjective and may not be widely shared by people who have never lived
in the neighborhood. Thus, they may add little or nothing to the market
value of the property. Moreover, these resources are largely nonfungible
and therefore irreplaceable. In addition to protecting the market value of
their home and their consumer surplus in that particular piece of real estate, residents will naturally want to protect those collective resources of
their neighborhood that they care about most, whether they are reflected
in the market value of their property or are part of their consumer surplus.85 These values can be almost priceless, especially for long-term
neighborhood residents. Like one’s home, one’s neighborhood may be
centrally bound up in one’s definition of self and the sense of his or her
place in the world.

80. Id. at 312.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 313.
83. Id.
84. See Mingche M. Li & H. James Brown, Micro-Neighborhood Externalities and Hedonic
Housing Prices, 56 LAND ECON. 125, 126 (1980) (arguing that neighborhood “amenities” are significant factors in market value of residential real estate).
85. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 416 (1977).
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IV. HARMS AND REMEDIES
Some property owners and residents in Seattle, such as neighbors of
the aPodments development in Capitol Hill mentioned earlier, have alleged damages to the neighborhood commons resulting from a significant increase in local housing density and the lack of any planned remedial efforts to enhance local resources, such as enhancing parking and
transportation facilities. While new residents may not realize the reduction in available resources, long-time residents will likely feel the hit as
will the commons.
Whereas it may seem, at first glance, that the significant capital and
profits generated from micro-housing developments are garnered only
because of the particularly high price-per-square-foot rates charged in
their leases,86 the consumer surplus present in the character of the neighborhood and the community resources arguably allows for those high
rental rates to be marketable. Such consumer surplus likely played a
large role in the siting of these high-density developments, and such
apartment complexes, on average, represent a significantly greater impact to the commons than adjacent single family homes tend to have.
Because the community commons has more significant utilization, the
per-person (or per-property) related consumer-surplus value is diminished.87 While all of the residents in the neighborhood pay for the privileges of the local consumer surplus, the only benefactors in this recent
scenario have been the developers and landlords of such apartment complexes.88 Though profit is an important element of incentivizing innovation and development, profit at the expense of others in such a way is not
an equitable or sustainable solution.
A. Limitations of Remedies at Law
By the time a building has been developed, or even by the earlier
date of the construction permit issuance, it is too late for neighboring
landowners to seek any remedy for such a reduction in their property
values. Property owners who face loss of value in their property due to
rezoning or neighbors’ conduct that falls below the nuisance threshold
have few remedies available at law.89 Due to the regulatory apparatus of
86. See Susan Kelleher, Seattle’s Micro-Housing Boom Offers an Affordable Alternative,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015, 4:04 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw-magazine/
seattles-micro-housing-boom-offers-an-affordable-alternative/ (stating price per square foot as high
as fifty dollars per month exist in some Seattle micro-housing units).
87. See Li & Brown, supra note 84.
88. Often, the same individual or partnership both builds and manages micro-housing units in
Seattle. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 5.
89. A nuisance is anything that is “injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
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Seattle building permitting, which allowed many nonconforming structures under the color of law, landowners’ claims of nuisance would fail
the “under the express authority of a statute” element, as all of the building projects received a stamp of regulatory approval before any construction commenced.
Moreover, the only context within nuisance jurisprudence in which
courts have recognized diminution of value claims is hazardous waste
contamination.90 Claims for diminution generally require a plaintiff to
show actual physical contamination—though some courts have found
mere stigma to be sufficient.91 Furthermore, claims are restricted when
contamination falls below regulatory levels, further demonstrating
courts’ accommodation to a potential tortfeasor’s reliance upon published regulations. At their core, claims of diminution are ones of perception: the attraction of the plaintiff and market to the land. The plaintiff,
the market, and the finder of fact must see the property as damaged in
some way and undesirable for such claims to be brought and have any
chance of success. This is a less likely occurrence in a rising real estate
market. The market desperate for real estate is less likely to care about
hypothetical stigma, and a jury, likely to include many who have been
priced out of the windfall in real estate, may feel more jealous than sympathetic towards a plaintiff claiming decreased appreciation.
For the case at hand, no traditional common law remedies will provide relief to landowners who believe that their property values have
been diminished by neighboring structures that negatively impact the
character of their neighborhood. There generally is no physical contamination in the landowner’s property from the construction of a higherdensity housing facility on an adjacent property. As such, under the current diminution of value jurisprudence, incumbent landowners are precluded from recovering any market value decrease in their property due
to nearby micro-housing development.
ment of the life and property.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.010 (2015). To prove a private cause of
action of nuisance, a plaintiff must show interference that has “injuriously affected” his use and
enjoyment of his property. Id. § 7.48.020. The causal conduct must be culpable and must not have
been done “under the express authority of a statute.” Id. § 7.48.160; see, e.g., Kitsap Cnty. v. Kitsap
Rifle & Revolver Club, 337 P.3d 328 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 352 P.3d 187 (Wash.
2015).
90. See, e.g., Berger v. Smith, 95 S.E. 1098 (N.C. 1912) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that if his
neighbor built a saw mill, it would cause injury to his property and depreciate its value). The court
held that injunctive relief was inappropriate as there was only speculative proof of any possible
injury. Id. at 1101. The court noted that if plaintiff’s conjectures were realized, he had a legal remedy. Id.
91. While some jurisdictions and occasional outlier trial courts allow owners of uncontaminated property to recover for the perceived “stigma” of being near contamination, they are the exception.
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B. Looking Toward a Plan for the Future
While restrictive guidelines on rental unit number reporting and recent city ordinances defining minimum standards for micro-housing developments are now in effect,92 given Seattle’s initial endorsement of
underregulated micro-housing permitting in the late 2000s, the dilemma
of dealing with yet-uncontemplated, novel development trends should be
an ongoing concern for any current Seattle resident or homeowner. Because residents generally cannot avail themselves to a remedy after the
construction of buildings that have slipped through zoning loopholes, and
there is a general preclusion of ex post facto legislation which would
change the statutory authority for such projects after they are underway,
the only potential solution under the current Washington regulations
would be to intervene in the permitting and preconstruction process—
before substantial reliance interests are created by high-density housing
developers.
Currently, the only regularly utilized methodology for higher scrutiny review of building permit and land use applications in Seattle involves the public comment process and the potential for further environmental assessments.93 Early developers of micro-housing apartments
evaded this process by exploiting loopholes in the local building code,
claiming justification for their action due to the prohibitively high cost
thresholds of engaging in community comment periods and developing
more comprehensive environmental impact plans.94
One author has suggested a community board solution, borrowed
from New York City’s model, to serve as a liaison between the public
and the planning and zoning boards to better avoid land use disputes that
emerge in the context of potential negative community impacts.95 The
groups would be similar to New York City’s community boards, which
provide an official body through which residents can propose zoning
changes and can respond to others’ proposals.96 Unlike New York City’s
community boards, however, the input groups would be required to conduct public hearings for each proposed land use permitting that could
92. Daniel Beekman, Seattle City Council Approves Restrictions on Micro-Apartments,
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-citycouncil-approves-restrictions-on-micro-apartments/.
93. Seattle Dep’t of Constr. & Inspections, Comment on a Project, SEATTLE.GOV,
http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/permits/commentonaproject/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
94. Holden, supra note 5. Some unhappy neighbors of properties that changed from single
family homes to complexes housing upwards of fifty to sixty additional people in separate dwellings
have claimed that they have experienced an injustice due to the lack of notice or ability to participate
in decisions that have had a significant impact on the character of their neighborhoods. Id.
95. Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the Connection?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 583 (2002).
96. Id.
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substantially affect property or living conditions within the neighborhood.97 While this proposal gains positive benefits of ensuring community participation in land use decisions, it does so at the cost of requiring
potentially unnecessary and costly public hearings every time a development with potential community effects is proposed.
C. A Third Option
A more efficient solution, which could better approximate both residents’ and developers’ needs, would be to utilize nonjudicial community
dispute resolution procedures during the building permitting process.
Chapter 7.75 of the Revised Code of Washington authorizes cities
and counties to create dispute resolution centers.98 Several jurisdictions
have established centers to resolve conflicts, including nuisance problems.99 While the majority of cases involve public nuisance issues such
as noise, animal complaints, and property maintenance concerns, there is
nothing that prohibits such boards from mediating other neighbor conflicts as well.
In order to significantly change the housing density of a piece of
property, the City should require developers to provide public notice of
their land use and development intentions within a reasonable timeframe
before the anticipated commencement of construction. Within this
timeframe, community members could have the option to schedule a
meeting with the developer at a dispute resolution center. These community dispute resolution centers could be utilized to clarify any plans and
calm any concerns of neighbors to better ensure a harmonious coexistence going forward. Moreover, if projects represented a significant
change to the character of the local community, with a related net decrease in adjacent property values, incumbent homeowners and developers could negotiate a fee to remediate this harm and proceed with con-

97. Id.
98. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.75 (2014).
99. For example, Bellevue’s Neighborhood Mediation Program began as a pilot project in the
code compliance division as an alternative to traditional enforcement of neighborhood issues.
Neighborhood Conflict, CITY OF BELLEVUE, http://www.ci.bellevue.wa.us/neighborhood_
conflict.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). The program is designed to enable citizens to resolve neighborhood problems, at the earliest possible stage, without government intervention. Id. Mercer Island
Neighborhood Mediation is a program administered by the Office of the City Attorney to help Mercer Island residents resolve disputes quickly, cooperatively, and cost-efficiently. See MUN.
RESEARCH & SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., NUISANCE REGULATION FOR WASHINGTON CITIES AND
COUNTIES 13 (2000), available at http://mrsc.org/getmedia/F487787A-3C3F-4D48-8E9A3DD8C3BFB6C2/nuisance.aspx. Clark County Community Mediation Services handles negotiable
disputes arising between neighbors throughout the county. Community Mediation Services, CLARK
CNTY., http://www.mediationclarkcounty.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
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struction, much as a party might buy an injunction from another to continue in some conduct considered to be a nuisance.
Further, community and developer conversations could also lead to
alternative solutions to better ensure maintenance of the character of the
community and mitigate any harms to the local commons, which might
come at a lesser aggregate cost if both interests are in agreement as to its
solution. If no mutually beneficial agreement can be reached between the
parties, the potential for a public comment and review cycle would
emerge. Officials at the SDCI could then determine whether or not such
review was necessary after hearing the concerns of both parties and conducting their own closer analysis of the proposed construction.
This system would create incentives for both incumbent homeowners and developers to participate in good faith. For those projects that
straddle the line between the letter of the zoning ordinance and improper
land use, developers would have the incentive to invest up to the amount
of the expense of a protracted public review (and possibly environmental
review) of their project directly into the surrounding community either
by paying individual landowners a fee to offset the diminution of their
property values, or investing in the community to directly respond to
harms to the commons, such as by providing more parking spaces or
paying into a community trust account to fund future needs. Incumbent
homeowners would be incentivized to participate by the possibility of
recapturing property value that would potentially be lost, if a developer
was forced to participate in a costly review but was still permitted to
build essentially the same type of property as was first intended.
Instead, rather than automatically requiring developers to participate in costly mandatory review processes, as has been advocated by
some parties resisting the micro-housing trend,100 the above proposed
solution aims to result in a more efficient mitigation to the property value
harms that increased density in residential neighborhoods might bring.
The central tenet of this solution is not that novel development projects
such as micro-housing construction are bad or that they should be dissuaded from development. Rather, the primary problem with this recent
trend in Seattle land development has been the value-grabbing behavior
of the developers of such projects. It is this value-grabbing that the solution attempts to solve.
100. Many of the parties resisting micro-housing development in Seattle have been local land
use and neighborhood activists such as the Capitol Hill neighborhood’s Dennis Saxman and Chris
Leman, who have opposed regulations that do not require mandatory review of micro-housing development proposals. See Justin Carder, Seattle’s New Regulations Leave Space for Densest Microhousing to Continue in Capitol Hill’s Core, CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:33
AM), http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2014/09/seattles-new-regulations-leave-space-for-densestmicrohousing-to-continue-in-capitol-hills-core/.
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Through the sort of cooperation incentivized by alternative dispute
resolution in this context, it is likely that sustainable profits can still be
maintained. At the same time, the consumer surplus of the neighborhood
character and commons may be sustained through developer concessions
such as the provision of parking, aesthetic design agreements, or at minimum providing some level of economic relief for those whose property
values have been decreased by adjacent high-density development.
CONCLUSION
While the above proposed solution would likely not endear itself to
either side of the land development debate, it will provide a comfortable
middle ground for both parties to avoid or mitigate the direct harms of
significant density shifts in established urban residential neighborhoods.
The general tenets of zoning as well as the Washington statutes and regulations that control how municipalities regulate their own development
point to community participation as an essential ingredient to the successful facilitation of economic efficiencies and the building of shared
value. Rather than continue to try to regulate from a top-down approach,
the City of Seattle should thoroughly consider the interests of both sides
of the debate on urban housing density increases. In so doing, Seattle
could explore the possibility of better solutions emerging from the community and neighborhood level, with involved community participation
as the GMA imagines, through a solution such as community dispute
resolution.

